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I. INTRODUCTION 
“With the Sabbath our Christianity and our country stand or fall.  A 
republic cannot endure without morality, nor morality without religion, 
nor religion without the Sabbath, nor the Sabbath without law.”1  Stated 
by prominent Christian lobbyist Wilbur Crafts in 1891, the above quote 
reflects the opinion of most American Christians of the late nineteenth 
century on the topic of Sabbath legislation.2  During that century, most 
states had some form of Sabbath legislation––that is, legislation to ensure 
the observance of the Christian Sabbath on Sunday.3  However, after the 
Civil War, many of those states did not enforce such legislation, at least 
not strictly, due to two factors: (1) interference by the national 
government and (2) willful ignorance of state officials.4  The national 
government interfered mainly by requiring the operation of post offices 
on Sunday and by failing to regulate the operation of railroads on 
Sunday.5  Even without such interference, many state officials turned a 
blind eye to the operation of commerce on Sunday, finding the need or 
desire for commerce to be stronger than that for observance of the 
religious day.6 
This shift to non-enforcement resulted in a great battle to keep what 
had been termed the “Civil Sabbath”––preservation of Sunday as a day 
of rest for civil, rather than religious, purposes.7  The battle was fought 
not only by Christian lobbyists, but also by “workingmen”––those who 
performed manual labor, usually in factories––who had become 
frustrated with their long hours and low wages.8  Although the Christian 
 
1 Wilbur F. Crafts, The Manifold Worth of the Sabbath, 8 OUR DAY 43 (Boston, 8th ed.), 
July 1891, at 23. 
2 See GAINES M. FOSTER, MORAL RECONSTRUCTION: CHRISTIAN LOBBYISTS AND THE 
FEDERAL LEGISLATION OF MORALITY, 1865–1920, at 93–96 (2002). 
3 Am. Sabbath Tract Soc’y, Present Sunday Laws of the States and Territories of the 
United States, 5 OUTLOOK & SABBATH Q. 321, 332–42 (Alfred Centre, N. Y. 1887) (on file 
with the Library of Congress). 
4 Sunday Rest Bill: Hearing on S. 2983 Before the S. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 50th 
Cong. 19 (Dec. 13, 1888) [hereinafter Dec. 13, 1888 Hearing]; Petitions Praying for the 
Passage of Legislation Prohibiting the Running of Mail Trains, Inter-state Trains, and the 
Drilling of United States Troops on Sunday, and Other Violations of the Sabbath: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 50th Cong. 13 (Apr. 6, 1888) [hereinafter Apr. 6, 
1888 Hearing]; FOSTER, supra note 2, at 94. 
5 See Apr. 6, 1888 Hearing, supra note 4, at 7–13. 
6 See Dec. 13, 1888 Hearing, supra note 4, at 19; see also FOSTER, supra note 2, at 134. 
7 FOSTER, supra note 2, at 95. 
8 See Dec. 13, 1888 Hearing, supra note 4, at 18 (petitioners from labor organizations 
totaling 900,000). 
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lobbyists and workingmen had vastly different purposes in the fight to 
keep the Civil Sabbath, they joined forces in an attempt to overcome their 
opponents.9  Different religious groups and freethinkers (secularists) 
strongly opposed the efforts of Christian lobbyists, while industrial 
owners and managers strongly opposed the efforts of workingmen.10 
The Sunday Rest Bill, like most legislation, was the product of its 
cultural influences.  In the late 1880s, the interests of Christian lobbyists 
and workingmen converged to create it.11  Introduced on December 13, 
1888, by Senator Henry W. Blair, the bill banned almost all Sunday work, 
games, and amusements in the United States territories and the District 
of Columbia.12  Among the states, the bill banned all interstate commerce, 
the operation of the postal system, and military parades and drills on 
Sunday.13  Although the bill’s stated purpose was civil in nature––mainly 
to provide a day of rest to laborers––it endured sharp criticism for its 
failure to separate church and state.14  Ultimately, the interests of different 
religious groups, freethinkers, and industrial owners converged to defeat 
it.15 
Part II of this Article discusses the historical background of the 
Sunday Rest Bill, explaining in more detail the influences that created it.  
Part III describes the Sunday Rest Bill at length, including the arguments 
for and against the passage of the bill.  Part IV examines the bill’s ultimate 
failure, as well as its later effects on similar legislation, and suggests the 
most likely reasons for both. 
 
 
 
 
 
9 See id. at 18–22. 
10 Id. at 56–59, 75–77; LABOR AND CAPITAL IN THE GILDED AGE: TESTIMONY TAKEN BY 
THE SENATE COMMITTEE UPON THE RELATIONS BETWEEN LABOR AND CAPITAL, 1883, 130–35 
(John A. Garraty, ed., 1968). 
11 Apr. 6, 1888 Hearing, supra note 4, at 3 (“Requirements of religion and requirements 
of civil law sometimes coincide.”). 
12 Dec. 13, 1888 Hearing, supra note 4, at 1. 
13 Id. at 1–2. 
14 L.K. Washburn, Protestant Menace to our Government, INGERSOLL SECULAR SOC’Y, 
Jan. 27, 1889. 
15 50 CONG. REC. S20,2640 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1889) (discharging the Sunday Rest Bill 
from committee); see FOSTER, supra note 2, at 134 (proposing that the Sunday Rest Bill likely 
failed because of the objections of different religious groups and others to the assertion of 
religious authority by the government). 
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II. SETTING THE SCENE: THE SUNDAY REST BILL’S HISTORICAL 
BACKGROUND 
The Sunday Rest Bill was the centerpiece of the late-nineteenth-
century battle to keep the Civil Sabbath.  The bill would not have been 
created, promoted, or debated, however, if it had not been for the 
convergence of several nineteenth-century issues and the people who 
cared about them.  Prominent among those issues were the advancement 
by Christian lobbyists of moral legislation and the struggle by 
workingmen for workers’ rights, such as labor union representation.16  
Senator Henry W. Blair was chiefly concerned with both issues and 
ultimately, introduced the Sunday Rest Bill.17  This Part discusses how 
Christian lobbyists, workingmen, and Senator Blair participated in the 
creation of the Sunday Rest Bill. 
 
A. Christian Lobbyists 
Believing that America was founded by (mostly) Christian men and 
on Christian principles, Christians of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries felt the national government ought to reflect 
“Christian character.”18  They believed that the nation could not survive 
without a strong adherence to morality.19 
Although Christian lobbyists had been advocating for Sabbath 
legislation since the early 1800s––mostly in the form of regulating the 
postal service––it was not until after the Civil War that the movement 
gained strength and influence.20  In previous attempts, the national 
government had rejected Sabbath legislation on the ground that it did not 
have the power to legislate morality.21  However, after the Civil War, the 
national government’s power expanded.22  Christian lobbyists revamped 
their efforts in hope that the government would be more willing to use its 
 
16 See Dec. 13, 1888 Hearing, supra note 4, at 3–18. 
17 See GORDON B. MCKINNEY, HENRY W. BLAIR’S CAMPAIGN TO REFORM AMERICA: 
FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO THE U.S. SENATE 134–39, 141–42 (2013). 
18 Henry W. Blair, The Future of the Temperance Reform, in INTOXICATING DRINKS & 
DRUGS IN ALL LANDS AND TIMES: A TWENTIETH CENTURY SURVEY OF TEMPERANCE, BASED 
ON A SYMPOSIUM OF TESTIMONY FROM ONE HUNDRED MISSIONARIES AND TRAVELERS 197, 199 
(Wilbur Fisk Crafts ed., Int’l Reform Bureau 1911); Nat’l Reform Ass’n, 15 CHRISTIAN 
STATESMAN 3, 11 (1881) (on file with the Library of Congress). 
19 FOSTER, supra note 2, at 93. 
20 See id. at 93–96. 
21 Id. at 11. 
22 Id. at 27. 
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power for moral legislation.23  The drastic decrease since the Civil War in 
observance of the Sabbath and enforcement of state Sabbath laws 
motivated lobbyists.24 
In the early 1880s, two major Christian lobbies––the Women’s 
Christian Temperance Union (“WCTU”) and the National Reform 
Association (“NRA”)––began to petition the government for a national 
Sunday law.25  Lobbyists believed that a national law would prevent many 
Sunday “disturbances,” such as trains and mail operations, as well as 
encourage the enforcement of state laws.26  They justified such a law 
under the theory of the “Civil Sabbath”––that the nation needed this law 
for the civil purposes of preserving the right of religious persons to rest 
and worship, preventing unrest between the rich and the poor by bonding 
them in a shared culture, and recognizing the rights of American 
workers.27  Although the WCTU, NRA, and other Christian lobbies also 
believed that a national law would establish God’s authority through the 
government, they chose not to emphasize that reason for the law because 
they believed their opponents could easily attack it as a violation of the 
principle of separation of church and state.28 
Instead, the lobbies focused on their strong civil arguments, 
advancing them through sermons, articles, public meetings, prayer 
meetings, and petitions.29  By 1888, nearly forty-one states with WCTU 
chapters had established superintendents for “Sunday work,” and the 
NRA made the national Sunday law a central part of its campaign.30  
Because both organizations were involved with the Temperance 
Movement, they had a strong national presence and therefore, did not 
have much trouble obtaining signatures for petitions.31  Additionally, 
Wilbur F. Crafts––a prominent traveling lobbyist––convinced the major 
 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 94. 
25 FOSTER, supra note 2, at 93. 
26 Id. at 94. 
27 Id. at 95, 97. 
28 See B.W. Williams, The Observance of the Sabbath, UNION SIGNAL 14, July 12, 1888, 
at 2 (on file with the Library of Congress). 
29 Nat’l Reform Ass’n, 25 CHRISTIAN STATESMAN 1, 9 (1891) (on file with the Library of 
Congress). 
30 FOSTER, supra note 2, at 96; Kate L. Shaw, Work of the WCTU for Sabbath Reform, 23 
CHRISTIAN STATESMAN 4, (Oct. 10, 1889) (on file with the Library of Congress). 
31 See FOSTER, supra note 2, at 197; see also Nat’l Reform Ass’n, 15 CHRISTIAN 
STATESMAN 4, 6–7 (1881) (on file with the Library of Congress). 
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churches across the country to form a committee on Sabbath reform, 
officially organized as the American Sabbath Union in 1888.32  Many of 
those churches signed the lobbyists’ petitions on behalf of all of their 
members.33  Before the Sunday Rest Bill was officially introduced in the 
Senate, the Christian lobbies sent to Congress 21,000 petitions, 
containing over 14 million signatures––roughly 25% of the American 
population.34 
 
B. The Effects of the Industrial Revolution 
While the Christian lobbies worked zealously to gather petition 
signatures for the national Sunday law, workingmen across the country 
began to grow weary of their jobs and agitated by their employers.35  
Although the United States’ transition from an agricultural nation to an 
industrial one between 1850 and 1900 brought much wealth and other 
benefits for capitalists and manufacturers, it also created difficulties for 
workers in industrial complexes to be able “to bargain on an equal basis 
with their employers over wages and working conditions.”36 
When the Senate Committee on Education and Labor investigated 
the growing labor unrest in the nation in 1882, its representatives, 
including Henry Blair, found that many industrial laborers worked 
fourteen to eighteen hour days with very little pay.37  The salaries men 
earned from these fourteen to eighteen hour days were not enough to 
support their families, and thus, wives and children were forced into such 
labor as well.38  Further, most laborers were forced to work every day of 
the week, including Sunday.39  In the early 1880s, one group of 450 
locomotive engineers petitioned the New York Central Railway 
specifically for the “cessation of Sunday labor.”40  The engineers stated in 
the petition that Sunday labor “ruined [their] health and prematurely 
[made them] feel worn out like old men.”41  These engineers were also 
 
32 FOSTER, supra note 2, at 98 (“Methodist Episcopal Church . . . Presbyterian Churches, 
the American Baptist Home Mission Society, Congregationalists, and other denominations”). 
33 E. J. Waggoner, The Blair Sunday Rest Bill, SENTINEL LIBR., Feb. 15, 1889, at 40–41. 
34 Dec. 13, 1888 Hearing, supra note 4, at 22; Apr. 6, 1888 Hearing, supra note 4, at 26. 
35 See generally LABOR AND CAPITAL IN THE GILDED AGE, supra note 10, at 21. 
36 Id. at 130–35. 
37 Id. at 14–15 (testimony of Samuel Gompers providing the example of car drivers). 
38 Id. at 14. 
39 Id. 
40 Apr. 6, 1888 Hearing, supra note 4, at 22. 
41 Id. 
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concerned about setting a bad precedent for their children in not honoring 
the Sabbath.42 
Similarly, many workers organized strikes to demand union 
representation.43  Soon, two large unions formed – the Knights of Labor 
and the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers.44  These unions focused 
on problems arising from wages and working conditions, but often 
proved too weak to ignite any effective change.45  In 1883, Senators Henry 
Blair and Samuel Gompers attempted to introduce union causes before 
the Senate, including proposals for an eight-hour workday law, weekly 
payment of wages, national charters for labor unions, and a national 
bureau of labor statistics.46  Unfortunately, Congress only passed 
legislation for the national bureau of labor statistics the following year.47 
In 1888, Wilbur Crafts traveled to different labor meetings to gain 
support for the national Sunday law.48  Although Crafts would later argue 
that labor unions were already supportive of the law, it was largely due 
to his influence that they became a large part of the effort to pass the 
Sunday Rest Bill.49  Before the bill was officially introduced in the Senate, 
labor unions sent to Congress several petitions consisting of over 900,000 
signatures from workingmen.50 
 
 
 
 
 
42 Id. at 22–23. 
43 See LABOR AND CAPITAL IN THE GILDED AGE, supra note 10, at 107–28; see also 
MCKINNEY, supra note 17, at 132, 140. 
44 Dec. 13, 1888 Hearing, supra note 4, at 18. 
45 See U.S. CONGRESS, SENATE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE 
OF THE SENATE UPON THE RELATIONS BETWEEN LABOR AND CAPITAL AND TESTIMONY TAKEN 
BY THE COMMITTEE, 93–525 (vol. 1 1885). 
46 Id. at 93–301, 361–86. 
47 48 CONG. REC. 15,4427 (daily ed. May 23, 1884) (speech in support of the bill); 48 
CONG. REC. S15,4285–86 (daily ed. May 19, 1884) (speech in support of the bill); 48 CONG. 
REC. S15,1746–50 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 1884) (speech in support of the bill); 48 CONG. REC. 
S15,16 (daily ed. Dec. 4, 1883) (speech in support of the bill); MCKINNEY, supra note 17, at 
139. 
48 Dec. 13, 1888 Hearing, supra note 4, at 22. 
49 Id. at 18–19, 22. 
50 Id. at 17. 
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C. Early Life and Career of Senator Henry W. Blair 
Senator Henry W. Blair, author and advocate of the Sunday Rest 
Bill, “came to symbolize the moral reformer in politics in the late 
1880s.”51  As a Congressman and as a Senator, Blair viewed all legislation 
through the lens of moral reform, particularly in regard to labor and 
education legislation.52  At least one biographer suggests it was Blair’s 
upbringing in the Christian reform culture of New England that 
influenced his outlook.53  He was raised during the Second Great 
Awakening – a religious revival that produced new religious practices, 
including greater involvement in politics.54  Blair was influenced by the 
idea that “American society could be greatly reformed or even perfected” 
through religious involvement in politics.55 
Similarly, Blair’s early life experiences influenced his later 
advocacy for labor and education reforms.56  His early letters describe his 
mother’s and his extensive labor efforts to pull themselves out of 
poverty.57  When Blair’s father died suddenly in a construction accident, 
his mother was forced to work continuously.58  Even with her efforts, she 
could not afford to keep her children, so she had to place most of them, 
including Blair, in foster homes.59  Although Blair’s mother died from 
scarlet fever seven years later, he stated that she died from “overwork, 
 
51 MCKINNEY, supra note 17, at 2. 
52 See id. at 2–3. 
53 Id. at 4. 
54 Id. at 8. 
55 Id. at 9. 
56 See Dec. 13, 1888 Hearing, supra note 4, at 95 (“I have been through all this that the 
working people go through.  I have been hungry when a boy . . . I have tugged along through 
the week and been tired out Saturday night, and I have been where I would have been 
compelled to work until next Monday morning if there had been no law against it.  I would 
not have had any chance to get the twenty-four hours rest if the Sunday law had not been 
given to me.”); MCKINNEY, supra note 17, at 4–5. 
57 See Memorandum from Henry W. Blair (Apr. 15, 1914) (on file with the Library of 
Congress under the Blair Papers); Letter from Henry W. Blair to Blanche L. Baker (Apr. 6, 
1911) (on file with the Library of Congress under the Blair Papers); Letter from Henry W. 
Blair to McGregor (June 19, 1899) (in CHARLES MCGREGOR, HISTORY OF THE FIFTEENTH 
REGIMENT NEW HAMPSHIRE VOLUNTEERS 1862–1863, 124 (1899)); Letter from Henry W. 
Blair to Charles Marseilles (Apr. 28, 1878) (on file with the N. H. Historical Soc’y under the 
Charles Marseilles Papers). 
58 MCKINNEY, supra note 17, at 10; Letter from Henry W. Blair to Blanche L. Baker (Apr. 
6, 1911) (on file with the Library of Congress under the Blair Papers). 
59 Letter from Henry W. Blair to Blanche L. Baker (Apr. 6, 1911). 
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grief, and poverty.”60  Because Blair lived with a “sense of orphanage and 
desolation,” he worked very hard for economic security, taking on the 
dual role of a teacher and a farmer to pay for his education.61  When Blair, 
as a Senator, learned of the educational difficulties and poor working 
conditions in the South, reforming those issues became his top priority.62  
He strongly advocated for recognition of American workers’ rights 
through the introduction of numerous pieces of legislation, including the 
bill that established the National Bureau of Labor Statistics.63 
As a Senator, Blair developed relationships with leaders of labor 
unions who regarded him as a “special friend.”64  He also had 
relationships with the “temperance Republicans” and other Christian 
lobbyists who often supported his campaigns by encouraging votes for 
him.65  Therefore, when his friends from the Christian lobbies and labor 
unions approached Blair to author the Sunday Rest Bill, he willingly 
accepted.66  Not only did Blair want to reciprocate support, he also 
strongly believed that the bill could bring about both moral reform and 
labor reform––protecting both the Sabbath Day and the rights of the 
workingmen.67 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
60 MCKINNEY, supra note 17, at 11–12; Letter from Henry W. Blair to McGregor (June 
19, 1899). 
61 Letter from Henry W. Blair to Charles Marseilles (Apr. 28, 1878); see MCKINNEY, 
supra note 17, at 13; Letter from Henry W. Blair to McGregor (June 19, 1899). 
62 See MCKINNEY, supra note 17, at 106–113. 
63 48 CONG. REC. 15,4427 (daily ed. May 23, 1884) (speech in support of Bureau of Labor 
Statistics); 48 CONG. REC. S15,4285–86 (daily ed. May 19, 1884) (speech in support of 
Bureau of Labor Statistics); 48 CONG. REC. S15,1746–50 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 1884) (speech in 
support of Bureau of Labor Statistics); 48 CONG. REC. S15,16 (daily ed. Dec. 4, 1883) (speech 
in support of Bureau of Labor Statistics); MCKINNEY, supra note 17, at 139. 
64 MCKINNEY, supra note 17, at 131. 
65 See id. at 74. 
66 Waggoner, supra note 33, at 14–15.  See generally Apr. 6, 1888 Hearing, supra note 
4; Dec. 13, 1888 Hearing, supra note 4. 
67 Dec. 13, 1888 Hearing, supra note 4, at 64, 95, 101. 
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III. THE SUNDAY REST BILL IN THE SENATE 
Once the forces behind the Civil Sabbath movement converged, it 
was not long before petitions flooded Congress and Blair introduced the 
Sunday Rest Bill.  This Part discusses the timeline of the introduction of 
the bill as well as the ensuing debate. 
 
A. Introduction of the Sunday Rest Bill 
After Congress received 21,000 petitions representing fourteen 
million signatures from Christian lobby and labor union groups 
advocating for a national Sunday law, Senator Blair raised the issue 
before the Senate committee he chaired––the Committee on Education 
and Labor––on April 6, 1888.68  At the hearing, the WCTU asked for three 
specific pieces of legislation: (1) the abolition of Sunday mail operations 
by the United States Postal Service, (2) the abolition of Sunday interstate 
commerce, and (3) the abolition of Sunday parades – military or 
otherwise.69  Wilbur Crafts asked for complete abolition of all Sunday 
government work and all Sunday interstate commerce for the benefit of 
American workers and the preservation of the American tradition.70 
Crafts stated that the Christian lobbies were petitioning “[o]n behalf 
of a million and a quarter of our fellow countrymen who are held in the 
Egyptian bondage of sabbathless toil, chiefly through the influence of the 
Government.”71  Crafts believed his requests were supported by labor 
reformers as the best means for improved working conditions, stating, “a 
man can get more rest by having one whole day in every week to be with 
his family than by an equal reduction of labor scattered through the seven-
day round of toil.”72  Although the lobbyists were adamant about the 
necessity of the reforms they requested, they admitted that they were 
willing to accept smaller reforms, such as limited post office hours on 
Sunday.73 
 
 
 
 
 
68 See generally Apr. 6, 1888 Hearing, supra note 4. 
69 Id. at 2. 
70 Id. at 4. 
71 Id. at 3. 
72 Id. at 4. 
73 Id. at 8 (“We will take a quarter of a loaf, half a loaf, or a whole loaf.”). 
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On May 21, 1888, Senator Blair officially introduced the Sunday 
Rest Bill (Senate Bill 2983) to the Senate, stating that he “endeavored to 
draw one which [would] facilitate [the] purposes” of the petitioners.74  On 
December 13, 1888, Blair brought the Sunday Rest Bill to discussion in 
a hearing before the Committee on Education and Labor.75  The bill 
banned all Sunday work or labor “to the disturbance of others,” save that 
of “necessity, and mercy and humanity,” and all games and amusements 
that might disturb others in the United States territories, the District of 
Columbia, and all other jurisdictions “under the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the United States.”76  Most commentators, then and now, believed this 
section of the bill only applied to the United States territories and the 
District of Columbia.77  Most states at the time, however, had similar 
provisions, and whether an activity was a “disturbance” to others was 
determined on a case-by-case basis.78  Labor of “necessity, [ ] mercy[,] 
and humanity” was generally considered only the work of police, doctors, 
nurses, restaurant keepers, hotelkeepers, and clergy, but states would also 
make those determinations on a case-by-case basis.79 
The bill also ended all collection or carrying of mail on Sunday 
throughout the states and territories, except in extreme circumstances.80  
It further prohibited all Sunday military and naval drills and parades, as 
well as all Sunday interstate commerce, except interstate commerce that 
was necessary due to unavoidable delay or emergency.81  Christian 
lobbyists expected that those who would be unemployed on Sunday as a 
result of the bill would nonetheless be paid for a full week’s worth of 
work even though no such requirement was written into the bill.82  They 
also expected that there would be very few unavoidable delays or 
emergencies that would require interstate commerce on Sunday, although 
such practical issues as perishable food and livestock transportation arose 
 
74 50 CONG. REC. S19,4452 (daily ed. May 21, 1888) (“Bills Introduced”). 
75 See generally Dec. 13, 1888 Hearing, supra note 4. 
76 Id. at 1. 
77 Id. at 103–05, 116; MCKINNEY, supra note 17, at 142; Waggoner, supra note 33, at 35. 
78 See Dec. 13, 1888 Hearing, supra note 4, at 19. 
79 Id. at 17; see id. at 18 (debates in New England over what constitutes a “work of 
necessity). 
80 Id. at 1–2. 
81 Id. at 2. 
82 Id. at 21 (“On this ground the engineers would be sustained in demanding, and if 
necessary, compelling the railroad companies to so readjust the pay schedule that the men 
would be paid as much as at present.”). 
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during the hearing.83 
 
B. Arguments and Efforts to Promote the Bill 
Well represented at the Senate committee hearing, Christian 
lobbyists were the strongest proponents of the Sunday Rest Bill.84  As 
mentioned, these lobbyists were largely responsible for the creation of 
the bill, using several methods to draw the public’s attention to the need 
for a Civil Sabbath.85  One method was distributing articles on the subject 
through newspapers and periodicals.86  The NRA had its own periodical, 
The Christian Statesman, specifically dedicated to advancing the NRA’s 
goals.87  In the years preceding the December Senate committee hearing, 
The Christian Statesman advanced the idea that the American Sabbath 
was in danger of being overcome by immigrant traditions of revelry and 
that such an event would threaten the liberty of the people because “when 
the working people spend their Sabbaths in revelry, they become the tools 
of factious designs.”88  Because the liberty of the people was at stake and 
the national government had a duty to secure liberty for all, the periodical 
argued that a national Sunday law would not infringe on the Tenth 
Amendment rights of the states.89  Other Christian groups advanced 
similar arguments, believing morality to be so important to the nation’s 
success that states’ rights came second.90 
When opponents attacked these arguments as promoting a policy 
that would violate the separation of church and state, Christian lobbyists 
changed their tune, arguing instead that a national Sunday law was 
necessary to protect the right of Christians to a day of rest and worship.91  
They claimed that government work and interstate commerce interfered 
with the Christian Sabbath and therefore, inhibited their religious 
 
83 Id. at 2, 29–30. 
84 See FOSTER, supra note 2, at 96–98. 
85 See id. at 97–100; Nat’l Reform Ass’n, 25 CHRISTIAN STATESMAN 1, 9 (1891) (on file 
with the Library of Congress). 
86 Nat’l Reform Ass’n, 25 CHRISTIAN STATESMAN 1, 9 (1891) (on file with the Library of 
Congress). 
87 See generally id. 
88 Nat’l Reform Ass’n, 15 CHRISTIAN STATESMAN 3, 6 (1881) (on file with the Library of 
Congress). 
89 Nat’l Reform Ass’n, 15 CHRISTIAN STATESMAN 29, 5 (1882) (on file with the Library 
of Congress). 
90 See MCKINNEY, supra note 17, at 141. 
91 See FOSTER, supra note 2, at 95. 
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practices.92  In other words, in order to protect the religious Sabbath, a 
Civil Sabbath was necessary.93  This argument included the idea that a 
Civil Sabbath would bond the rich and poor as they participated in the 
shared culture.94 
By the time the Sunday Rest Bill reached the December Senate 
committee hearing, the Christian lobbyist arguments had evolved even 
further as they mainly gave civil reasons for why the bill should pass.95  
Lobbyists argued that the bill presented a scenario in which religious and 
civil law merely coincided, rather than an attempt to establish religious 
law through the government.96  Instead of emphasizing the need to protect 
the rights of Christians, they emphasized the need to protect the rights of 
American workingmen.97  At the time of the hearing, over three million 
people in a workforce of approximately seventeen million worked on 
Sunday.98  According to Wilbur Crafts’ estimates, around two million of 
those workingmen performed “needless Sunday work,” and around 
600,000 of them were railroad workers and postal employees.99  When 
referring to the concurrent labor unrest in the nation, Crafts stated, 
“[s]trikes would not so easily pass into riots if laborers were not so many 
of them demoralized by being deprived of the Sabbath’s humanizing 
home fellowship and its culture of conscience.”100  Crafts compared the 
labor situation to slavery, stating, “[i]n a very literal sense our nation is 
‘laying up wrath’ by its delay to emancipate out three millions of ‘white 
slaves’ from their Sunday slavery.”101  “Sunday work is unpaid toil in a 
deeper sense than that of the slaves of the South.”102  J.C. Bateham, one 
of the WCTU’s leaders, supported these ideas, asserting that state 
Sabbath laws needed to be protected from the “encroachment of capital” 
and that the WCTU had all unprejudiced workingmen on their side.103  
 
92 Dec. 13, 1888 Hearing, supra note 4, at 22. 
93 See id. 
94 FOSTER, supra note 2, at 95. 
95 See Dec. 13, 1888 Hearing, supra note 4, at 3–24. 
96 Apr. 6, 1888 Hearing, supra note 4, at 3. 
97 See Dec. 13, 1888 Hearing, supra note 4, at 3–24. 
98 Id. at 16–17. 
99 Id. at 17. 
100 Wilbur F. Crafts, Transcontinental Notes on Sabbath Desecration, in 6 OUR DAY: A 
REC. & REV. OF CURRENT REFORM 31, 40 (Joseph Cook ed., 1890). 
101 Crafts, supra note 1, at 40. 
102 Id. at 1. 
103 Dec. 13, 1888 Hearing, supra note 4, at 22. 
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Furthermore, she claimed that the only groups who opposed the Sunday 
Rest Bill were those who stood to make a profit from Sabbath desecration 
(excepting only the Seventh Day Adventists).104 
Responding to arguments that the bill was a religious law disguised 
as a civil law, Bateham and Crafts portrayed their position as consistent 
with liberty, arguing that Sabbath laws were laws of national self-
preservation and that anyone who threatened those laws also threatened 
liberty.105  Sabbath laws were laws intended to prevent criminal activity, 
harmonize labor and capital, protect the home, and protect the nation’s 
historic institutions.106  Therefore, the real threat was not those who 
supported Sabbath laws, but rather those who opposed them.107  Senator 
Blair joined in the chorus, stating that the bill was not being decided on 
religious grounds and could not be because of the disagreement between 
religious groups as to which day is the legitimate Sabbath Day.108  Rather, 
the bill was being decided on “the ground of what is good for human 
beings here in this world.”109  Echoing the same sentiments, several other 
Christian lobbyists appeared at the hearing to speak to the issue, most of 
which had been attending the first official conference of the American 
Sabbath Union––an organization made up of the nation’s largest 
churches.110  The organization had formed in just weeks prior to the 
hearing at the encouragement of Crafts and conveniently, held its first 
conference in Washington, D.C. at the time of the hearing.111 
Although not present at the hearing, workingmen and labor unions 
confirmed the lobbyists’ civil arguments.  As mentioned, in the early 
1880s, a group of 450 locomotive engineers petitioned the New York 
Central Railway for the “cessation of Sunday labor.”112  The engineers 
stated in the petition that Sunday labor “ruins [their] health and 
prematurely makes [them] feel worn out like old men.”113  They believed 
 
104 Id. at 23–24. 
105 Dec. 13, 1888 Hearing, supra note 4, at 125–26. 
106 Id. 
107 See id. 
108 Id. at 64. 
109 Id. 
110 FOSTER, supra note 2, at 98. See generally Dec. 13, 1888 Hearing, supra note 4, at 64. 
111 See MCKINNEY, supra note 17, at 142; Opposed to Sunday Work, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 
1888, available at http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-
free/pdf?res=9901E3DB1330E633A25755C0A9649D94699FD7CF. 
112 Apr. 6, 1888 Hearing, supra note 4, at 22. 
113 Id. 
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that working seven days was unnecessary as they could do all their work 
within six days if given a day to rest.114  Soon many other workingmen 
agreed, believing that if the Sunday Rest Bill was passed, they would be 
able to demand the same payment because they would be able to do the 
same amount of work in six days.115  As a result, in the immediate years 
preceding the introduction of the Sunday Rest Bill, labor unions such as 
the national Knights of Labor union traveled the country to advocate for 
better enforcement of state Sabbath laws.116  Once the bill was introduced, 
the Knights of Labor and many state unions fully endorsed it.117 
The Sunday Rest Bill not only had support from workingmen and 
labor unions, but also from some railroad managers as well.118  General 
Divens, manager of the Erie Railway for thirty years, fully supported the 
bill and argued at the hearing that railways had the full capacity to do all 
of their work in six days, rather than seven.119  However, if one railway 
shut down on Sunday while others operated, that railway would be at a 
competitive disadvantage, and therefore, a national law was needed to 
mandate uniformity.120  Divens further asserted that the Sunday Rest Bill 
was preferable to the status quo because with a day of rest, the workmen 
would be in better condition for service and therefore, perform their work 
more efficiently and effectively.121  A letter introduced at the hearing from 
H.B. Ledyard––a railroad manager at Michigan Central Company––
reinforced Divens’ points and added that although the railroad consumers 
would likely react negatively to the new law initially, they would become 
accustomed to it over time.122 
After the hearing, Christian lobbies and labor unions traveled the 
country to support the bill, continuing to argue the aforementioned civil 
reasons for its passage.123  Due to their efforts, they were able to send in 
several additional petitions for the committee’s consideration.124 
 
114 Id. at 23. 
115 See Dec. 13, 1888 Hearing, supra note 4, at 21. 
116 See id. at 19–20. 
117 FOSTER, supra note 2, at 98. 
118 See Dec. 13, 1888 Hearing, supra note 4, at 26; Apr. 6, 1888 Hearing, supra note 4, 
at 21–22. 
119 Dec. 13, 1888 Hearing, supra note 4, at 26. 
120 See id. 
121 Id. 
122 Apr. 6, 1888 Hearing, supra note 4, at 21–22. 
123 FOSTER, supra note 2, at 100; see Dec. 13, 1888 Hearing, supra note 4, at 17–19. 
124 See FOSTER, supra note 2, at 100. 
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C. Arguments and Efforts to Terminate the Bill 
While Christian lobbyists and labor unions worked diligently to 
promote the Sunday Rest Bill, several other groups worked just as 
diligently to undo their efforts.  The Seventh Day Adventist Church 
(“SDAC”) was the primary public opponent of the bill, believing that the 
true Sabbath should be honored on Saturday, not Sunday.125  The church, 
however, did not advocate for a similar bill for Saturday, but rather 
believed that any such legislation violated the First Amendment’s 
demand for separation of church and state.126  They sought to expose the 
Christian lobbyists’ true purpose as establishing religious authority 
through the use of government law, rather than trying to help the 
workingman.127  For similar reasons, the Seventh Day Baptist Church 
(“SDBC”) also opposed the bill, albeit less adamantly, as they were 
willing to support the bill if the SDBC and SDAC were exempted from 
its requirements.128 
Both churches had been fighting this battle for some time––at least 
several years before the introduction of the bill––as they adamantly 
opposed the enforcement of state Sunday laws.129  Because members of 
the SDAC and SDBC believed the Sabbath should be honored on 
Saturday, state Sunday laws forced them to give up two days of work and 
(sometimes) amusement.130  Members of both churches believed state 
governments persecuted them because they often faced punishment for 
attempting to work on Sunday to keep up with their competitors.131  The 
American Sabbath Tract Society, a group formed from the SDBC, 
advocated for the churches’ rights through the monthly publication of its 
periodical, The Outlook and Sabbath Quarterly.132  In the periodical’s 
 
125 See Dec. 13, 1888 Hearing, supra note 4, at 75–101; FOSTER, supra note 2, at 99. 
126 Dec. 13, 1888 Hearing, supra note 4, at 76. 
127 See id. at 76–87; FOSTER, supra note 2, at 99. 
128 See Dec. 13, 1888 Hearing, supra note 4, at 41–43. 
129 See id. at 41; Am. Sabbath Tract Soc’y, Present Sunday Laws of the States and 
Territories of the United States, 5 OUTLOOK & SABBATH Q. 321, 332 (Alfred Centre, N. Y. 
1887) (on file with the Library of Congress). 
130 Dec. 13, 1888 Hearing, supra note 4, at 41. 
131 See id. at 98–101. 
132 See Am. Sabbath Tract Soc’y, 3 OUTLOOK & SABBATH Q. 1, 1 (Alfred Centre, N.Y. 
1884) (“Devoted to general reform, Christian culture, a better observance of the Sabbath, and 
advancement of the cause of Temperance.”) (on file with the Library of Congress); Am. 
Sabbath Tract Soc’y, 6 OUTLOOK & SABBATH Q. 449, 450 (Alfred Centre, N.Y. 1888) (“The 
times demand a reconsideration of our Sunday laws.  They are practically inoperative.”) (on 
file with the Library of Congress). 
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issues between 1884 and 1888, the Society argued that state Sunday laws 
were enforced under the notion that minority religions must suffer to 
appease the majority Christian religion.133  They argued that one religion 
should not dominate the other through civil law; rather, “[i]f Sunday or 
any other day can be saved as a day of worship, it must be by an appeal 
to the individual conscience, and not to the civil law.”134 
Both the SDAC and the SDBC presented these arguments in the 
December Senate committee hearing regarding the Sunday Rest Bill.135  
Alonzo T. Jones––one of the strongest opponents from the SDAC––
frustrated the Christian lobbies’ position, attacking it on all grounds.136  
Jones first appealed to religion, stating that even Scripture teaches that 
religious sentiments should not be enforced through government.137  
Although government may regulate the relationship between men, it 
cannot regulate the relationship between God and man.138  As stated by St. 
Augustine, “[i]t is indeed better that men should be brought to serve God 
by instruction than by fear of punishment or by pain.”139  Further, Jones 
argued there is no actual disturbance created by not regulating the 
Christian Sabbath; if there was, then every other religion would likewise 
be disturbed by the non-regulation of their Sabbath.140  Moreover, the only 
way a government can justify protecting one Sabbath over another is 
through the establishment of a theocracy.141  Addressing the argument that 
the bill was mostly for the benefit of the workingmen, Jones proclaimed 
that most workingmen did not even know the bill was before the Senate.142  
Moreover, because most states had stopped enforcing their Sunday laws, 
Jones argued, such actions indicated that the majority of the American 
people were not in favor of a national Sunday law.143 
 
 
133 Am. Sabbath Tract Soc’y, 3 OUTLOOK & SABBATH Q. 97, 114–15 (Alfred Centre, N.Y. 
1885) (on file with the Library of Congress). 
134 Am. Sabbath Tract Soc’y, 3 OUTLOOK & SABBATH Q. 65, 74–75 (Alfred Centre, N.Y. 
1885) (on file with the Library of Congress). 
135 See Dec. 13, 1888 Hearing, supra note 4, at 41–43, 75–101. 
136 See id. at 75–101. 
137 Id. at 75–76. 
138 Id. at 76. 
139 Id. at 85. 
140 Id. at 87–88. 
141 Dec. 13, 1888 Hearing, supra note 4, at 87–88. 
142 Id. at 95. 
143 Id. at 97. 
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Both the SDBC and the SDAC continued to oppose the bill in the 
months following the hearing, particularly in regard to exposing the 
“frauds” under which the bill was perpetuated.144  The churches were 
determined to show that the bill was not for the workingmen, but rather 
only for Christians.145  They wrote numerous articles describing the 
history of national Sunday laws, beginning with Constantine in 321 A.D. 
and explaining that every Sunday law since then had a religious basis.146  
Therefore, they reasoned Christian lobbyists could not claim that this 
Sunday law was based on civil motivations, rather than on religious 
motivations.147  Crafts himself, when speaking to the Knights of Labor in 
November of 1888, stated, “[a] weekly day of rest has never been secured 
in any land except on the basis of a religious obligation.  Take the religion 
out and you take the rest out.”148 
Further, as questioned by SDAC leader E.J. Waggoner, if the 
workingmen were “clamoring for” the Sunday Rest Bill, why were none 
of them at the hearing, and why did Crafts believe it was necessary to 
travel to speak with them?149  Crafts’ own recording of his meeting with 
the Knights of Labor showed that the workingmen needed to be 
convinced of the benefits of the bill, at least at first, as they were worried 
about losing a day’s worth of pay.150  A local newspaper described another 
such meeting with the National Council of Brotherhood of Locomotive 
Engineers in October of 1888, a “victory” for Crafts, as if he had 
convinced the workingmen of his cause, rather than the other way 
around.151  Additionally, at least some workingmen were not convinced.  
A labor reform paper titled Ideas of Reform, which was dedicated to the 
interests of workingmen, advocated against the passage of the Sunday 
Rest Bill in January of 1889, stating that the bill was “an attempt to unite 
 
144 See Waggoner, supra note 33, at 36–38. 
145 See id. at 36. 
146 See Dec. 13, 1888 Hearing, supra note 4, at 43–44; Am. Sabbath Tract Soc’y, 6 
OUTLOOK & SABBATH Q. 3, 450–80 (Alfred Centre, N. Y. 1888) (on file with the Library of 
Congress); Am. Sabbath Tract Soc’y, 6 OUTLOOK & SABBATH Q. 481, 481–512 (Alfred 
Centre, N.Y. 1888) (on file with the Library of Congress); Waggoner, supra note 33, at 23–
25. 
147 Dec. 13, 1888 Hearing, supra note 4, at 44. 
148 Waggoner, supra note 33, at 24. 
149 Id. at 37. 
150 See Dec. 13, 1888 Hearing, supra note 4, at 20–21 (Crafts presented an abstract of the 
meeting in which engineers asked him if the Sunday Rest Bill would result in lower wages.). 
151 Waggoner, supra note 33, at 38; National Council of Brotherhood of Locomotive 
Engineers, DAILY UNION SIGNAL, Oct. 22, 1888 (on file with the Library of Congress). 
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Church and State,” and that, “14 million petitioners should not be allowed 
to dictate how 60 million [would] worship.”152 
Besides the “workingmen fraud,” E.J. Waggoner also sought to 
expose the “petition fraud,” claiming that the petitions originally 
submitted to the Senate on behalf of a national Sunday law did not amass 
fourteen million signatures, but rather only an eighth of that number.153  
Many organizations and groups signed on behalf of their members.154  For 
example, although only around 200 representatives from the Knights of 
Labor signed the petitions, their signatures were counted as 200,000, or 
the entire number of the members of the organization.155  Additionally, 
Christian lobbyists confirmed that the signature of one man––Cardinal 
James Gibbons––was counted as 7,300,000 or the entire number of 
Catholics in the nation.156  Thus, Waggoner argued the bill did not have 
as much widespread support as the Christian lobbyists claimed.157 
Secularists, known as freethinkers, also strongly opposed the bill.158  
Before the national law’s introduction, Robert G. Ingersoll travelled the 
country to gather forces against the enforcement of state Sabbath laws, 
asking citizens to pledge not to vote for any congressman in favor of such 
enforcement.159  Ingersoll was a freethought leader, known later as “The 
Great Agnostic,” who had a personal vendetta against Christianity 
motivated by the church’s poor treatment of his father, who had been a 
preacher.160  Following Ingersoll’s example, L.K. Washburn, another 
freethought leader, encouraged the members of the Ingersoll Secular 
Society to oppose the Sunday Rest Bill as unconstitutional and a threat to 
liberty.161  Speaking to the Society in January of 1889, Washburn stated: 
 
 
 
152 Waggoner, supra note 33, at 38; Sunday Rest Bill, IDEAS OF REFORM, Jan. 1, 1889 (on 
file with the Library of Congress). 
153 Waggoner, supra note 33, at 40–41. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
158 See Dec. 13, 1888 Hearing, supra note 4, at 56–60. 
159 Nat’l Reform Ass’n, 15 CHRISTIAN STATESMAN 20, 4 (1882) (on file with the Library 
of Congress). 
160 Rufus Wilson, “Bob” Ingersoll: A Sketch of America’s Most Noted Agnostic, ELMIRA 
TELEGRAM, Mar. 16, 1890, at 1. 
161 Washburn, supra note 14, at 4. 
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This Sabbath bill is an attempt on the part of Christians to take away the liberty 
of their neighbors.  It is for the purpose of compelling the people to accept their 
religious opinions, to oblige them to attend church and support Christian worship.  
This proposed law is a blow at private rights and public blessings.  It aims not 
only to take away the freedom of the individual, its object is to stop public 
benefactions.
162
 
Washburn claimed that less than twenty-five percent of the nation’s 
population believed Sunday to be the Sabbath, and therefore, a national 
Sunday law would not convince the nation of the day’s holiness.163  Even 
if it did, the law would still be unconstitutional because it would 
“enslave” sixty million people, the entire population of the nation at the 
time, to the will of only fourteen million by forcing the religion of the 
latter on the former.164 
Other secular leagues opposed the bill for similar reasons.  For 
example, the National Liberal League opposed all Sunday laws because 
the league believed that all government legislation ought to be secular in 
nature.165  Also, both the Secular League of United States and the National 
Defense Association were formed to prevent “the encroachment of 
ecclesiastical ideas upon legislation.”166  Representing the latter 
organizations at the December Senate hearing, John B. Wolfe stated that 
the Sunday Rest Bill was based on the idea that “the end justifies the 
means,” and “there never was a more dangerous basis for action, either 
in public legislation or private morality.”167  Congress could not do 
indirectly that which it was expressly forbidden from doing by the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.168  Further, Wolfe argued 
no workingman was forced to work on Sunday against his will; rather, 
workingmen chose their professions and elected to work on Sunday.169  
Because workingmen could decline to work on Sunday, they were not 
harmed by the lack of a national Sunday law.170 
 
 
 
162 Id. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 Nat’l Reform Ass’n, 15 CHRISTIAN STATESMAN 19, 2 (1881) (on file with the Library 
of Congress). 
166 Dec. 13, 1888 Hearing, supra note 4, at 56. 
167 Id. at 57. 
168 See Dec. 13, 1888 Hearing, supra note 4, at 57. 
169 See id. at 59–60. 
170 See id. at 59–63. 
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Although weaker evidence exists, one can reasonably assume that 
industrial owners and managers used similar arguments against the 
passage of the Sunday Rest Bill.  As stated by J.C. Bateham at the 
hearing, businessmen––particularly owners of newspapers, railroads, 
steamboats, and saloons––largely opposed the bill.171  Even before the 
hearing, when Blair investigated the labor conditions in the South, many 
businessmen came forward to defend labor conditions, stating that 
interference by the government in industry was “contrary to American 
institutions” because the government could turn industries into political 
machines.172  Further, those businessmen argued that if a man did not like 
his profession, he could always choose another through education.173  
When Blair asked about the idea of a shortened workweek, the 
businessmen claimed that a shortened week would actually harm 
workingmen because it would increase the demand for labor and attract 
foreigners to take their jobs for lower pay.174 
Senators Payne, Call, and Palmer exhibited similar concerns when 
asking questions of the witnesses during the hearing.  For example, when 
questioning General Diven, Senator Palmer was strongly concerned that 
the bill could significantly impair the transportation of cattle on railroads 
because cattle could not remain in train cars for longer than forty-eight 
hours without becoming sick or dying.175  Other senators later reinforced 
this concern after the hearing.176  Senator Call also expressed concern that 
the American people would not support the idea of paying postal workers 
for seven days when they had only worked six.177  In addition, Senator 
Payne suggested that the bill would significantly impair commerce, 
particularly in the territories, due to restrictions on what could be deemed 
a “disturbance,” such as driving.178  All three Senators seemed to fear the 
effects the bill could have on the nation’s growing industries, and with 
the exception of General Diven, there is no evidence that industrial 
 
171 Id. at 23–24. 
172 LABOR AND CAPITAL IN THE GILDED AGE, supra note 10, at 130. 
173 Id. at 133–34. 
174 Id. at 135. 
175 Dec. 13, 1888 Hearing, supra note 4, at 29–30. 
176 50 CONG. REC. S20,831 (daily ed. Jan. 16, 1889) (Senator Harrison Riddleberger, a 
Democrat from Virginia, said that the Sunday Rest Bill would make it impossible to ship 
cattle from the West to eastern markets.). 
177 Dec. 13, 1888 Hearing, supra note 4, at 48–49. 
178 Id. at 20. 
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owners opposed these sentiments.179 
In the months following the bill’s hearing, these groups of 
opponents––the SDAC, SDBC, freethinkers, and industrial owners––
were able to strengthen their forces and sent Congress petitions from 
thirty-one states, amassing 230,000 signatures.180  Although supporters of 
the bill sent in nearly nine times as many petitions as opponents, the 
strengthened arguments of the opponents seemingly affected the Senate 
committee and the bill’s further proceedings.181 
 
IV. THE FAILURE AND SUCCESS OF THE SUNDAY REST BILL 
Blair’s Sunday Rest Bill ultimately failed.  Not only did the bill not 
pass Congress, it also never reached the Congressional floor for debate 
because it was never reported out of the Committee on Education and 
Labor.182  Even though the bill did not become law, it still influenced later 
legislation to bring victories for both Christian lobbyists and laborers.183  
Therefore, although the bill failed in one sense, it succeeded in another.  
This Part discusses the bill’s immediate failure and long-term success, as 
well as, the reasons for both. 
 
A. How and Why the Bill Failed to Become Law 
Following the Sunday Rest Bill’s December hearing, it remained in 
the Senate Committee on Education and Labor for three months.184  
Although thousands of copies of the hearing’s testimony were printed for 
Congress’ use during that time, the bill was only occasionally mentioned 
on the floor of Congress, usually in connection with a petition for or 
against it.185  The WCTU presented the majority of the petitions in favor 
of the bill, and such petitions outnumbered opponents’ petitions almost 
 
179 See generally id.; LABOR AND CAPITAL IN THE GILDED AGE, supra note 10. 
180 See 50 CONG. REC. S20,2136 (daily ed. Feb. 21, 1889). 
181 Exhibit A; see also 50 CONG. REC. 20,461–2727 (daily ed. Jan. 2–Mar. 2 1889) (on 
file with the Library of Congress). 
182 50 CONG. REC. S20,2640 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1889); see FOSTER, supra note 2, at 100. 
183 See FOSTER, supra note 2, at 100–06. 
184 See 50 CONG. REC. 20,461–2619 (1889). 
185 S. REP. NO. 2499 (Jan. 30, 1889) (from the 50th Congress, Second session) (“To 
accompany Senate concurrent resolution to print 32,000 extra copies of Mis. Doc. No. 43, 
50th Congress, 2nd Session, being the hearing before the Committee on Education and Labor 
on S. 2983, known as the Sunday rest bill.”) (on file with the Library of Congress); see Exhibit 
A; see also 50 CONG. REC. 20,461–2727 (daily ed. Jan. 2–Mar. 2 1889) (on file with the 
Library of Congress). 
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nine to one.186  Yet, the Senate committee did not vote on the bill during 
those three months, as Blair seemingly could not convince his fellow 
committee members to take action.187  On March 2, 1889, the last day of 
the second session of the fiftieth Congress, Senator Joseph Dolph, a 
Republican from Oregon, moved to discharge the bill from committee 
and bring it to the floor for debate.188  Such a parliamentary maneuver was 
designed to kill the bill as only one Senator needed to object to the debate 
to force the bill to be held over until the next Congress and reintroduced 
as a new bill.189  Therefore, when one Senator did object, the bill died.190 
On December 9, 1889, Blair introduced a second version of the 
Sunday Rest Bill (Senate Bill 946) with slightly modified language.191  
Instead of securing the enjoyment of the “Lord’s day,” the revised bill 
secured the “privileges of rest and of religious worship . . . on the first 
day of the week.”192  Although the bill’s proposed purpose had been 
modified, its language remained largely the same.193  The bill was again 
referred to the Committee of Education and Labor, but it was not given a 
hearing, and did not reach the Senate floor.194  Although the WCTU 
increased its efforts and sent in even more petitions in support of the bill 
than before, the bill again failed.195 
Both attempts at passing the Sunday Rest Bill failed for several 
reasons. The most likely reasons are: (1) its opponents advanced stronger 
arguments than its proponents, (2) a majority of the states did not support 
it, (3) neither Republicans nor Democrats fully supported it, and (4) it 
was inimical to America’s emerging consumer society.  First, although 
the petitions received by Congress from the bill’s proponents greatly 
outnumbered those from the bill’s opponents, the persuasiveness of 
opponents’ arguments seemed to swing the pendulum of the debate in 
 
186 Exhibit A; see also 50 CONG. REC. 20,461–2727 (daily ed. Jan. 2–Mar. 2 1889) (on 
file with the Library of Congress). 
187 Exhibit A; see also 50 CONG. REC. 20,461–2727 (daily ed. Jan. 2–Mar. 2 1889) (on 
file with the Library of Congress); FOSTER, supra note 2, at 100. 
188 50 CONG. REC. S20,2640 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1889). 
189 See FOSTER, supra note 2, at 100. 
190 See 50 CONG. REC. S20,2640 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1889); FOSTER, supra note 2, at 100. 
191 51 CONG. REC. S21,124 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 1889). 
192 Id. 
193 See The Blair Sunday Rest Bill and Joint Resolution, SENTINEL LIBR., Dec. 15, 1889, 
at 2–6. 
194 See FOSTER, supra note 2, at 100. 
195 Id. 
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their favor.196  Opponents easily exposed the threatened First-Amendment 
violation in the bill, portraying it as hostile to individual liberty. 197  
Because the bill’s purpose was to protect the enjoyment of the “Lord’s 
day,” opponents did not struggle to convince Americans that the bill was 
simply an attempt to establish religious authority, rather than a means of 
helping workingmen.198  As stated by John Wolfe at the Senate hearing, 
the title of the bill itself “confirms the charge that [it] is intended to be 
the enforcement of the Sabbath from a religious stand-point.”199 
Further, opponents easily argued that workingmen neither strongly 
favored the bill, nor stood to gain much from the bill’s passage, because 
of the largely unanswered evidence that supported the truth of such 
arguments.200  As suggested by E.J. Waggoner, if laborers were 
demanding a national Sunday law, why were they not present at the 
hearing?201  Moreover, why did they send so few petitions, and why was 
Crafts seemingly attempting to recruit them to support the bill only 
months before the Senate hearing?202  As stated by Alonzo T. Jones at the 
hearing, such evidence suggested that most workingmen did not even 
know the bill existed or what its consequences might be.203  Of those who 
knew of it, they seemed hesitant to support it, fearing they would lose a 
days’ wages as a result.204  Other reforms seemed more promising, such 
as proposals for national charters for labor unions and required weekly 
payment of wages.205  Thus, if the workingmen’s demands were not the 
impetus behind the bill, the bill appeared unnecessary.206 
 
 
 
196 Exhibit A; see also 50 CONG. REC. 20,461–2727 (daily ed. Jan. 2–Mar. 2 1889) (on 
file with the Library of Congress). 
197 See also Dec. 13, 1888 Hearing, supra note 4, at 75–101; Waggoner, supra note 33, 
at 28–30.  See generally Washburn, supra note 14. 
198 See also Dec. 13, 1888 Hearing, supra note 4, at 75–101; Waggoner, supra note 33, 
at 36–38.  See generally Washburn, supra note 14, at 197. 
199 Dec. 13, 1888 Hearing, supra note 4, at 105. 
200 See, e.g., Waggoner, supra note 33, at 36–38. 
201 Id. at 38. 
202 Id. at 37–38. 
203 Dec. 13, 1888 Hearing, supra note 4, at 95. 
204 See, e.g., id. at 20. 
205 See REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE UPON THE RELATIONS BETWEEN LABOR 
AND CAPITAL AND TESTIMONY TAKEN BY THE COMMITTEE, supra note 45, at 93–101 (Aug. 6, 
1883); MCKINNEY, supra note 17, at 134. 
206 See Waggoner, supra note 33, at 36–38. 
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Likely due to these persuasive arguments and other factors, a 
majority of the states, particularly those in the South and the West, 
presumably did not support the Sunday Rest Bill.207  Of the 404 petitions 
sent to Congress from the states, practically none in favor of the bill came 
from southern or western states.208  Rather, most of the petitions came 
from the Northeast and Midwest, with the top five states sending the most 
petitions being New York (39), Pennsylvania (36), Michigan (33), Illinois 
(32), and Iowa (28).209  On the other hand, California sent one of the 
largest petitions in opposition to the bill, amassing over 31,000 
signatures, and at least one petition in opposition amassed 230,000 
signatures from thirty-one states across the country.210  Such evidence 
suggests that most southern and western states did not favor the bill, or at 
least did not support it.  Besides the influence of opponents’ arguments, 
the southern and western states were also likely influenced by their 
desires to no longer enforce their state Sunday laws.211  The lifestyle of 
the West in particular did not welcome regulation of Sabbath 
observance.212  Further, although Blair’s congressional career focused 
mainly on improving education and working conditions for Southerners, 
most Southerners viewed his efforts as intrusive rather than helpful.213  
Therefore, they did not desire the implementation of most of his proposed 
legislation, including the Sunday Rest Bill.214 
Perhaps in relation to the disapproval of the majority of the states, 
neither Republicans nor Democrats fully supported the Sunday Rest Bill.  
Indeed, most Democrats opposed the bill as impractical and ineffective.215  
Senator Harrison Riddleberger, a Democrat from Virginia, expressed 
 
207 Exhibit A; see also 50 CONG. REC. 20,461–2727 (daily ed. Jan. 2–Mar. 2 1889) (on 
file with the Library of Congress). 
208 Exhibit A; see also 50 CONG. REC. 20,461–2727 (daily ed. Jan. 2–Mar. 2 1889) (on 
file with the Library of Congress). 
209 Exhibit A; see also 50 CONG. REC. 20,461–2727 (daily ed. Jan. 2–Mar. 2 1889) (on 
file with the Library of Congress). 
210 50 CONG. REC. S20,2185 (daily ed. Feb. 21, 1889). 
211 See Dec. 13, 1888 Hearing, supra note 4, at 43 (Reverend A. H. Lewis stating that 
most states had disregarded their Sunday laws because of a strong change in public opinion.). 
212 See CLIFTON E. OLMSTEAD, HISTORY OF RELIGION IN THE UNITED STATES, 355 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1960) (on file with the George Mason Univ. Sch. of Law Library). 
213 See Anson Phelps Stokes & Leo Pfeffer, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 
10–11, 41–75 (N.Y. 1950). 
214 Id. 
215 See, e.g., 50 CONG. REC. S20,831 (daily ed. Jan. 16, 1889); Dec. 13, 1888 Hearing, 
supra note 4, at 9, 20, 48–49. 
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concern about the bill’s effect on the ability of railroads to transport cattle 
from the West to the East.216  Because the bill would require layovers on 
Sunday, cattle might be kept in the train cars for much longer than 
intended, andcould become ill and die as a result.217  Further, of the five 
Senators on the Committee for Education and Labor, two were 
Democrats, and both appeared particularly hostile to the bill during the 
December hearing.218  When Crafts argued that closing the postal service 
on Sunday would improve the morals of postal workers, Senator Henry 
Payne of Ohio responded that, although London’s postal services were 
closed on Sunday, the city was still the “most immoral . . . in the world.”219  
Payne expressed serious doubts that postal workers would attend church 
if given the opportunity on Sunday, or that any type of moral reform 
would take place as a result of the bill.220  Similarly, Senator Wilkinson 
Call of Florida aggressively questioned Reverend George Elliot, a 
witness from the Methodist Episcopal Church, on how the lack of a 
Sunday law effectively “forced” citizens to violate their conscience, as 
alleged by the Reverend.221  Call suggested that postal workers were not 
forced to either violate the Sabbath or quit their jobs, but rather had a 
third option of requesting not to work on Sunday and finding a 
replacement.222  Call was also severely skeptical of Americans’ 
willingness to allow the government to pay postal workers the same 
amount for only six days of work, and of the willingness of private 
companies to do the same for their workers.223  Finally, Call foresaw issues 
with defining “work of mercy,” and seemingly believed that many would 
try to exempt themselves from the regulations of the bill.224 
Republicans expressed similar concerns to those of Democrats.  
Senator Thomas Palmer, a Republican from Michigan also on the 
Committee for Education and Labor, echoed Riddleberger’s beliefs that 
the bill would produce transportation nightmares for cattle owners and 
meat producers.225  Although General Diven responded that refrigerator 
 
216 50 CONG. REC. S20,831 (daily ed. Jan. 16, 1889). 
217 Dec. 13, 1888 Hearing, supra note 4, at 29–30. 
218 Id. at 9, 20, 48–49. 
219 Id. at 9. 
220 Id. at 9, 47. 
221 Id. at 47. 
222 Id. 
223 Dec. 13, 1888 Hearing, supra note 4, at 48–49. 
224 Id. at 49. 
225 Id. at 29–30. 
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cars would resolve the problem, Palmer shot back that such a solution 
would grant a monopoly of the transportation of beef to refrigerator-car 
makers, and that Congress did not have the authority through the 
interstate commerce clause to regulate the rates that makers would charge 
for the use of their refrigerator cars.226  With Palmer joining the position 
of the two Democrat committee members, Blair was outnumbered in his 
own Republican committee, at least three to two.227  Further, even though 
Republicans controlled the Senate at the time, none appeared to advocate 
for the passage of the bill during congressional proceedings.228  In fact, a 
Republican took the initiative to kill the bill through a parliamentary 
maneuver.229 
The concerns from Republicans and Democrats alike centered on the 
practical effects of the bill, particularly how it might harm commerce.230  
In the consumer culture that developed after the Industrial Revolution, 
Americans became particularly wary of government interference in 
industry and interstate commerce.231  Although weaker evidence exists, 
one can reasonably assume that industrial owners and managers lobbied 
Congress for protection from bills that threatened their production or 
profits.232  Even Senator Blair implied as much.233  When the Republican 
Party did not re-nominate Senator Blair to return to the Senate for the 52nd 
Congress, he directly blamed the interests of railroads and other 
industries.234  Still, if the influence from industrial lobbying was not as 
strong as presumed, the preferences of the states appeared to be strongly 
shifting in favor of consumerism over religious observance.235  With both 
 
226 Id. 
227 Id. at 1 (The five members on the committee were Senators Blair, Wilson, Payne, Call, 
and Palmer.). 
228 Exhibit A; see also 50 CONG. REC. 20,461–2727 (daily ed. Jan. 2–Mar. 2 1889) (on 
file with the Library of Congress). 
229 50 CONG. REC. S20,2640 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1889). 
230 See, e.g., Dec. 13, 1888 Hearing, supra note 4, at 9, 29–30, 47–49. 
231 See FOSTER, supra note 2, at 134 (“The emerging consumer society . . . posed a 
formidable challenge to the passage of Sabbath laws”); see also Dec. 13, 1888 Hearing, supra 
note 4, at 23–24 (Those who opposed the bill were those who wished to make a profit on 
Sunday.). 
232 Dec. 13, 1888 Hearing, supra note 4, at 23–24 (Those who opposed the bill were those 
who wished to make a profit on Sunday.). 
233 See Stokes & Pfeffer, supra note 213, at 18–19. 
234 Id. 
235 Dec. 13, 1888 Hearing, supra note 4, at 43 (stating that most state Sunday laws were 
disregarded due to a strong shift in public opinion). 
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such a strong shift toward consumerism, and with the influence of 
opponents’ arguments supported by the majority of states and 
representatives in Congress, the Blair Sunday Rest Bill was condemned 
to fail. 
 
B. Influence of the Bill on Later Victories for Laborers and 
Christian Lobbyists 
Despite the bill’s failure to become law, its ideas and goals affected 
later successful legislation.236  In 1889, the WCTU and the NRA, along 
with several other Christian lobbies, opposed the opening of the World’s 
Fair on Sunday.237  Through numerous petitions and extensive lobbying, 
the groups convinced Congress to pass an amended appropriations bill, 
allowing appropriation for the World’s Fair, only if the fair remained 
closed on Sunday.238  Crafts claimed this achievement was the “greatest 
moral victory since emancipation.”239 
Additionally, in the 1890s and early 1900s, the National Bureau of 
Reforms, WCTU, and local Christian societies petitioned to close 
individual post offices on Sunday.240  Meanwhile, postal workers began to 
pressure Congress for a reduction of hours.241  Postal workers had been 
working an average of 13–16 hours per day.242  In response to these 
complaints and others, Senator Samuel Gompers proposed a national 
eight-hour workday law.243  As a compromise, in 1912, Congress passed 
legislation to prohibit the delivering or carrying of mail on Sunday by all 
U.S. post offices, except for those in very rural areas, which retained the 
option to remain open for limited hours.244  Finally, the culmination of the 
 
236 See FOSTER, supra note 2, at 100–06. 
237 Id. at 101. 
238 See id. at 101–05 (This legislation was largely undone, however, by the Illinois 
Supreme Court, which upheld the right of the Fair’s stockholders to keep their operation open 
over the right of the Government to enforce its legislation.). 
239 Wilbur F. Crafts, Editorial Notes, OUR DAY 9, Sept. 1892, at 691. 
240 The Christian lobby in Washington, D.C., formed and led by Wilbur Crafts.  See 
FOSTER, supra note 2, at 134. 
241 FOSTER, supra note 2, at 134. 
242 Dec. 13, 1888 Hearing, supra note 4, at 4. 
243 See REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE UPON THE RELATIONS BETWEEN LABOR 
AND CAPITAL AND TESTIMONY TAKEN BY THE COMMITTEE, supra note 45, at 93–101. 
244 FOSTER, supra note 2, at 134; Steve Olenski, How the USPS Decision to Stop Saturday 
Mail Delivery Will Affect Marketers, FORBES (Feb. 7, 2013, 10:37 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/marketshare/2013/02/07/how-the-usps-decision-to-stop-
saturday-mail-delivery-will-affect-marketers/ (Today, most U.S. post offices remain closed 
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long-fought Temperance Movement—the nineteenth-century movement 
to prohibit the sale of alcohol—resulted in the ratification of the 18th 
Amendment on January 16, 1919.245  As stated by historian Gaines M. 
Foster, “Prohibition proved not the triumph of Christian government, but 
of Christians in government” because Christian lobbyists succeeded in 
convincing Congress to allow “the majority dictate moral behavior.”246 
As evidenced by the reforms implemented by Christian lobbyists 
and laborers in later years, it is clear that their influence had significant 
effects on Congressional decisions.  However, this influence was limited 
because, “[m]embers of Congress were willing to make a symbolic 
statement associating the state with God but not to imbue it with religious 
authority.”247  Therefore, although lobbyists for the Sunday Rest Bill were 
able to bring Congress to a compromise in later years, they still could not 
convince Congress to implement a bill that lacked significant support. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
The battle for a Civil Sabbath ultimately ended in defeat for 
Christian lobbyists and workingmen.  Although Christian lobbyists in 
particular made extensive efforts to gather support around the country, 
the movement lacked proper support.  Even though the nation was still 
heavily influenced by religious sources, it was entering a new era that 
was also heavily influenced by consumerism and pragmatism.  Religious 
ideals were no match for the desire to promote developing industries, or 
the desire to protect the Constitution from theocratic influences. 
Even though it was never enacted, the Sunday Rest Bill still stands 
as an example of influential legislation.  The bill could have been altered 
to reflect more neutral language and to address its pragmatic difficulties, 
but instead it presented rather far-fetched policy regulations.  Such ideas 
made later policy suggestions seem more reasonable, and thus, 
compromises were formed.  Even if not intended, the lobbyists for the 
Sunday Rest Bill exhibited effective strategy to bring about the reforms 
they desired, albeit not completely.  Therefore, although the Sunday Rest 
Bill lost the battle over the Civil Sabbath, it may have won the war over 
the enactment of religiously motivated legislation. 
 
on Sunday.  Beginning in August of 2013, the U.S. postal service will cease first-class delivery 
of mail also on Saturday, but only for economical reasons.). 
245 See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII. 
246 FOSTER, supra note 2, at 220. 
247 Id. at 106. 
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Exhibit A248 
 
Petitions For and Against the Sunday Rest Bill 
 
Petitions by Date 
State Petitions For or  
Against 
Date Page 
Number 
 
Michigan 
 
1 
 
For 
 
1/9/1889 
 
633 
Iowa 2 For 1/10/1889 634 
Wisconsin 1 Against 1/11/1889 688 
Michigan 1 For 1/11/1889 678 
Wisconsin 1 Against 1/12/1889 724 
Indiana 1 For 1/14/1889 770 
Michigan 1 For 1/14/1889 724 
Wisconsin 1 Against 1/14/1889 770 
Iowa 4 For 1/16/1889 831 
Virginia 1 For 1/16/1889 831 
New 
Hampshire 
1 For 1/16/1889 831 
Connecticut 1 For 1/16/1889 831 
Texas 1 For 1/16/1889 831 
Massachusetts 1 For 1/16/1889 831 
Michigan 1 For 1/16/1889 831 
New York 1 For 1/16/1889 831 
Oregon 1 For 1/16/1889 831 
Mississippi 1 For 1/16/1889 831 
Indiana 1 For 1/16/1889 831 
Delaware 1 For 1/16/1889 831 
Maine 1 For 1/16/1889 831 
 
248 Compiled and organized from 50 CONG. REC. 20,461–2727 (daily ed. Jan. 2–Mar. 2 
1889) (on file with the Library of Congress). 
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Wisconsin 1 For 1/16/1889 831 
New 
Hampshire 
1 For 1/16/1889 832 
New Jersey 1 For 1/16/1889 832 
Indiana 1 For 1/16/1889 832 
Massachusetts 1 For 1/16/1889 832 
Delaware 1 For 1/16/1889 832 
Illinois 1 For 1/16/1889 832 
Iowa 1 For 1/16/1889 832 
Dakota 1 For 1/16/1889 832 
Washington 1 For 1/16/1889 832 
DC 1 For 1/16/1889 832 
New York 1 For 1/16/1889 832 
Michigan 1 For 1/16/1889 832 
Pennsylvania 1 For 1/16/1889 830 
Illinois 1 For 1/16/1889 830 
South Carolina 1 For 1/16/1889 830 
Ohio 1 For 1/16/1889 830 
Missouri 1 For 1/17/1889 880 
Alabama 1 For 1/17/1889 880 
North Carolina 1 For 1/17/1889 880 
Illinois 1 For 1/18/1889 916 
Dakota 1 For 1/18/1889 916 
Michigan 1 For 1/18/1889 916 
New York 1 For 1/18/1889 932 
Ohio 1 For 1/18/1889 932 
Virginia 1 For 1/18/1889 962 
Kentucky 1 For 1/19/1889 965 
Virginia 1 For 1/19/1889 965 
Tennessee 1 For 1/19/1889 965 
Illinois 1 For 1/19/1889 1002 
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Wisconsin 1 Against 1/19/1889 1016 
Iowa 1 For 1/21/1889 1017 
Dakota 1 For 1/21/1889 1017 
Minnesota 1 Against 1/21/1889 1017 
Illinois 1 For 1/21/1889 1017 
Kansas 1 For 1/21/1889 1017 
Minnesota 1 Against 1/21/1889 1072 
Dakota 1 For 1/22/1889 1073 
DC 1 For 1/22/1889 1073 
Michigan 1 For 1/22/1889 1073 
Massachusetts 1 For 1/22/1889 1073 
New York 1 For 1/22/1889 1073 
Kansas 1 For 1/22/1889 1118 
West Virginia 1 For 1/23/1889 1118 
Illinois 1 Against 1/23/1889 1159 
Michigan 1 For 1/23/1889 1159 
New Jersey 1 For 1/24/1889 1160 
Michigan 1 For 1/24/1889 1160 
New York 1 For 1/24/1889 1160 
Pennsylvania 1 For 1/24/1889 1160 
Dakota 1 For 1/25/1889 1163 
Illinois 1 For 1/25/1889 1163 
New York 1 For 1/25/1889 1163 
Ohio 1 For 1/25/1889 1163 
Massachusetts 1 For 1/25/1889 1163 
Texas 1 For 1/25/1889 1164 
Iowa 1 Against 1/26/1889 1215 
Illinois 1 For 1/28/1889 1233 
Ohio 1 For 1/28/1889 1233 
Ohio 3 For 1/28/1889 1234 
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Kentucky 1 For 1/28/1889 1234 
DC 1 For 1/28/1889 1234 
Pennsylvania 1 For 1/28/1889 1234 
New York 1 For 1/28/1889 1234 
Kansas 1 For 1/28/1889 1234 
Iowa 1 For 1/28/1889 1273 
Minnesota 1 For 1/28/1889 1273 
Michigan 1 For 1/28/1889 1273 
Michigan 1 For 1/28/1889 1274 
Maine 1 For 1/29/1889 1274 
South Carolina 1 For 1/30/1889 1324 
Ohio 1 For 1/30/1889 1324 
Illinois 1 For 1/30/1889 1339 
Georgia 1 For 1/31/1889 1366 
Massachusetts 1 For 1/31/1889 1366 
New York 1 For 1/31/1889 1366 
Illinois 1 For 1/31/1889 1366 
Georgia 2 For 1/31/1889 1367 
Missouri 5 For 1/31/1889 1367 
Ohio 2 For 1/31/1889 1367 
Kentucky 1 For 1/31/1889 1367 
Texas 1 For 1/31/1889 1367 
Minnesota 2 For 1/31/1889 1367 
Vermont 2 For 1/31/1889 1367 
Illinois 5 For 1/31/1889 1389 
Michigan 2 For 1/31/1889 1389 
Indiana 1 For 1/31/1889 1389 
Wisconsin 1 For 1/31/1889 1389 
North Carolina 2 For 1/31/1889 1389 
South Carolina 1 For 1/31/1889 1389 
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Nebraska 1 For 1/31/1889 1389 
New York 2 For 1/31/1889 1389 
Maryland 1 For 1/31/1889 1389 
Dakota 1 For 1/31/1889 1389 
West Virginia 1 For 1/31/1889 1389 
Connecticut 1 For 1/31/1889 1389 
Virginia 1 For 1/31/1889 1389 
New Jersey 1 For 1/31/1889 1389 
Massachusetts 2 For 1/31/1889 1389 
New 
Hampshire 
1 For 1/31/1889 1389 
Arkansas 2 For 1/31/1889 1389 
Pennsylvania 1 For 1/31/1889 1389 
Tennessee 1 For 1/31/1889 1389 
California 1 For 1/31/1889 1389 
Massachusetts 1 For 1/31/1889 1366 
Michigan 1 For 1/31/1889 1366 
New York 1 For 1/31/1889 1366 
Iowa 1 For 1/31/1889 1366 
Illinois 1 For 1/31/1889 1366 
Ohio 1 For 1/31/1889 1366 
Illinois 1 For 1/31/1889 1369 
Michigan 1 For 1/31/1889 1389 
Iowa 1 For 2/1/1889 1390 
New York 1 For 2/1/1889 1390 
Massachusetts 1 For 2/1/1889 1398 
New York 1 For 2/1/1889 1425 
Michigan 1 For 2/1/1889 1425 
Kansas 1 For 2/1/1889 1425 
Wisconsin 1 For 2/1/1889 1425 
Iowa 1 For 2/2/1889 1425 
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Maine 1 For 2/4/1889 1453 
New Jersey 1 For 2/4/1889 1453 
Pennsylvania 1 For 2/4/1889 1454 
Texas 1 For 2/4/1889 1454 
Dakota 1 For 2/4/1889 1454 
Maryland 1 For 2/4/1889 1454 
Iowa 1 For 2/4/1889 1500 
Kansas 1 For 2/4/1889 1500 
New York 2 For 2/4/1889 1500 
Michigan 3 For 2/5/1889 1500 
Ohio 1 For 2/5/1889 1543 
Virginia 1 For 2/5/1889 1507 
Connecticut 1 For 2/5/1889 1542 
Wisconsin 1 For 2/5/1889 1543 
Iowa 1 For 2/5/1889 1500 
Indiana 2 For 2/5/1889 1543 
DC 1 For 2/5/1889 1543 
Minnesota 1 For 2/5/1889 1543 
Missouri 1 For 2/5/1889 1543 
New York 1 For 2/5/1889 1500 
Kansas 1 For 2/5/1889 1500 
Pennsylvania 1 For 2/5/1889 1543 
New York 1 For 2/5/1889 1500 
Illinois 3 For 2/6/1889 1544, 1545, 1589 
New Jersey 1 For 2/6/1889 1589 
Pennsylvania 3 For 2/6/1889 1544, 1589 
Michigan 2 For 2/6/1889 1589 
Virginia 1 For 2/6/1889 1544 
Maine 1 For 2/6/1889 1589 
New York 2 For 2/6/1889 1545 
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Dakota 1 For 2/6/1889 1589 
Minnesota 1 For 2/6/1889 1589 
Maryland 1 For 2/6/1889 1589 
Missouri 1 For 2/6/1889 1589 
Ohio 1 For 2/6/1889 1589 
Iowa 2 For 2/7/1889 1590, 1638 
Dakota 1 For 2/7/1889 1638 
Maryland 1 For 2/7/1889 1590 
South Carolina 2 For 2/7/1889 1590, 1600 
New Jersey 1 For 2/7/1889 1590 
Minnesota 3 For 2/7/1889 1590, 1638 
Ohio 2 For 2/7/1889 1590, 1638 
Pennsylvania 1 For 2/7/1889 1638 
New York 1 For 2/7/1889 1638 
New York 2 For 2/8/1889 1707 
Missouri 2 For 2/8/1889 1648 
Missouri 1 Against 2/8/1889 1648 
Illinois 2 For 2/8/1889 1638, 1707 
Dakota 2 For 2/8/1889 1638, 1639 
DC 1 For 2/8/1889 1707 
Massachusetts 2 For 2/8/1889 1648, 1707 
Massachusetts 1 For 2/9/1889 1708 
New York 1 For 2/9/1889 1740 
Kentucky 2 For 2/11/1889 1741, 1765 
Pennsylvania 1 For 2/11/1889 1741 
Georgia 1 For 2/11/1889 1741 
Illinois 1 For 2/11/1889 1765 
Mississippi 1 For 2/11/1889 1741 
New York 1 For 2/11/1889 1741 
Indiana 1 For 2/11/1889 1765 
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California 1 For 2/11/1889 1765 
Michigan 2 For 2/11/1889 1765, 1741 
Ohio 1 For 2/11/1889 1765 
Pennsylvania 1 For 2/11/1889 1765 
Maryland 1 For 2/11/1889 1765 
New York 3 For 2/13/1889 1815, 1879 
Iowa 1 For 2/13/1889 1879 
Pennsylvania 1 For 2/13/1889 1879 
Nebraska 2 For 2/13/1889 1815, 1880 
Iowa 1 For 2/14/1889 1880 
Georgia 1 For 2/14/1889 1880 
Mississippi 1 For 2/14/1889 1880 
Nebraska 1 For 2/14/1889 1880 
Pennsylvania 1 For 2/14/1889 1917 
Michigan 1 For 2/15/1889 1880 
Iowa 1 For 2/15/1889 1918 
New 
Hampshire 
1 For 2/15/1889 1918 
South Carolina 1 For 2/15/1889 1918 
Pennsylvania 1 For 2/15/1889 1918 
Rhode Island 1 For 2/15/1889 1918 
Missouri 1 For 2/15/1889 1918 
Illinois 2 For 2/15/1889 1918 
West Virginia 1 For 2/15/1889 1918 
New York 1 For 2/15/1889 1918 
Michigan 1 For 2/15/1889 1955 
Pennsylvania 1 For 2/15/1889 1917 
Ohio 2 For 2/15/1889 1918, 1964 
Mississippi 1 For 2/15/1889 1918 
Arkansas 1 Against 2/16/1889 1965 
Michigan 1 For 2/16/1889 1999 
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New York 2 For 2/16/1889 1965, 1999 
Florida 1 For 2/16/1889 1965 
Pennsylvania 1 For 2/16/1889 1965 
Ohio 1 For 2/16/1889 1999 
Dakota 1 For 2/16/1889 1965 
Massachusetts 1 For 2/16/1889 1965 
Illinois 1 For 2/16/1889 1965 
Kentucky 1 For 2/16/1889 1999 
Indiana 2 For 2/16/1889 1965, 1999 
Maine 1 For 2/16/1889 1999 
Kansas 1 For 2/16/1889 1965 
Missouri 1 For 2/16/1889 1965 
Virginia 1 For 2/16/1889 1999 
Pennsylvania 1 For 2/18/1889 2033 
DC 1 For 2/18/1889 2033 
Michigan 1 For 2/18/1889 1999 
Illinois 2 For 2/18/1889 1999, 2033 
Iowa 1 For 2/18/1889 2033 
Connecticut 1 For 2/18/1889 2033 
Pennsylvania 3 For 2/19/1889 2034, 2080 
New York 1 For 2/19/1889 2080 
Nebraska 1 For 2/19/1889 2080 
Connecticut 1 For 2/19/1889 2034 
Texas 1 For 2/20/1889 2130 
Illinois 1 For 2/20/1889 2135 
New York 1 For 2/20/1889 2081 
New York 1 Against 2/20/1889 2081 
Florida 1 For 2/20/1889 2135 
Washington 1 For 2/20/1889 2135 
Iowa 1 For 2/21/1889 2136 
BETHANY RUPERT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/3/2015  3:48 PM 
2015] THE SUNDAY REST BILL 323 
Dakota 1 For 2/21/1889 2136 
South Carolina 1 For 2/21/1889 2136 
New York 1 For 2/21/1889 2136 
New York 1 Against 2/21/1889 2136 
California 1 Against 2/21/1889 2185 
Michigan 1 Against 2/21/1889 2185 
Ohio 1 For 2/21/1889 2136 
Alabama 1 For 2/21/1889 2136 
Missouri 1 For 2/21/1889 2136 
Michigan 1 For 2/21/1889 2185 
Pennsylvania 1 For 2/22/1889 2236 
Virginia 1 For 2/22/1889 2187 
Maine 2 Against 2/22/1889 2197, 2236 
Massachusetts 1 Against 2/22/1889 2236 
Massachusetts 1 For 2/22/1889 2187 
Oregon 1 Against 2/22/1889 2231 
New York 2 For 2/22/1889 2187, 2236 
West Virginia 1 For 2/22/1889 2236 
California 1 Against 2/22/1889 2185 
Michigan 1 Against 2/22/1889 2185 
Wisconsin 1 For 2/22/1889 2236 
Michigan 1 For 2/22/1889 2185 
Kentucky 1 For 2/23/1889 2278 
Pennsylvania 2 Against 2/25/1889 2279, 2280 
Iowa 1 For 2/25/1889 2305 
Illinois 1 For 2/25/1889 2279 
Dakota 1 For 2/25/1889 2279 
Nebraska 1 For 2/25/1889 2305 
Pennsylvania 2 For 2/25/1889 2279, 2305 
Missouri 1 For 2/25/1889 2305 
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New Jersey 1 For 2/25/1889 2305 
Massachusetts 1 For 2/25/1889 2305 
Ohio 1 For 2/25/1889 2305 
Minnesota 1 Against 2/25/1889 2279 
Wisconsin 2 Against 2/25/1889 2279 
Ohio 1 Against 2/25/1889 2279 
Colorado 1 Against 2/25/1889 2279 
Indiana 1 Against 2/25/1889 2279 
Missouri 1 Against 2/25/1889 2279 
Michigan 1 For 2/25/1889 2305 
Iowa 3 For 2/26/1889 2369 
Rhode Island 1 For 2/26/1889 2369 
Pennsylvania 2 For 2/26/1889 2306, 2369 
Kansas 1 For 2/26/1889 2369 
Wisconsin 1 For 2/26/1889 2369 
New York 1 For 2/27/1889 2425 
Massachusetts 1 Against 2/27/1889 2371 
Wisconsin 1 For 2/27/1889 2425 
Michigan 1 For 2/27/1889 2371 
Minnesota 1 Against 2/27/1889 2425 
Georgia 1 For 2/27/1889 2425 
Missouri 1 Against 2/27/1889 2371 
Washington 1 For 2/27/1889 2425 
Indiana 1 Against 2/27/1889 2371 
Iowa 1 For 2/28/1889 2495 
New Jersey 1 Against 2/28/1889 2426 
Delaware 1 For 2/28/1889 2495 
Ohio 1 Against 2/28/1889 2426 
Ohio 1 For 2/28/1889 2495 
Missouri 1 Against 2/28/1889 2426 
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Iowa 1 Against 3/1/1889 2498 
Iowa 2 For 3/1/1889 2495, 2498 
New Mexico 1 For 3/1/1889 2498 
New 
Hampshire 
1 For 3/1/1889 2498 
New 
Hampshire 
1 Against 3/1/1889 2498 
Illinois 2 For 3/1/1889 2498 
Illinois 1 Against 3/1/1889 2498 
Pennsylvania 1 For 3/1/1889 2577 
Dakota 1 For 3/1/1889 2497 
New York 2 For 3/1/1889 2497, 2577 
Massachusetts 1 For 3/1/1889 2497 
Arkansas 1 For 3/1/1889 2497 
New Mexico 1 For 3/1/1889 2577 
Pennsylvania 1 For 3/1/1889 2577 
New Jersey 1 Against 3/1/1889 2497 
Delaware 1 For 3/1/1889 2495 
Kansas 1 For 3/1/1889 2577 
Wisconsin 2 For 3/1/1889 2497, 2498 
Ohio 2 For 3/1/1889 2495, 2497 
Indiana 1 For 3/1/1889 2498 
Missouri 1 Against 3/1/1889 2497 
Missouri 1 For 3/1/1889 2577 
Michigan 2 For 3/2/1889 2727 
New 
Hampshire 
3 For 3/2/1889 2619, 2727 
Pennsylvania 2 For 3/2/1889 2639, 2727 
Pennsylvania 1 Against 3/2/1889 2639 
Massachusetts 1 For 3/2/1889 2619 
Ohio 1 For 3/2/1889 2727 
New Jersey 1 For 3/2/1889 2727 
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Illinois 1 For 3/2/1889 2727 
Missouri 1 For 3/2/1889 2727 
Connecticut 1 For 3/2/1889 2727 
Missouri 1 For 3/2/1889 2580 
Missouri 1 Against 3/2/1889 2580 
Washington 1 For 3/2/1889 2727 
Indiana 1 For 3/2/1889 2580 
Total Number of Petitions (Jan. 2 – March 2, 1889): 404 
 
Petitions by State (excluding states not yet part of the union – Alaska, 
Arizona, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Utah, Wyoming) 
State 
 
For Against 
Alabama 2 0 
Arkansas 3 1 
California 2 2 
Colorado 0 1 
Connecticut 6 0 
Dakota (North and South) 15 0 
Delaware 4 0 
Florida 2 0 
Georgia 6 0 
Illinois 32 2 
Indiana 10 2 
Iowa 28 2 
Kansas 9 0 
Kentucky 7 0 
Louisiana 0 0 
Maine 5 2 
Maryland 5 0 
Massachusetts 18 2 
Michigan 33 2 
Minnesota 8 4 
Mississippi 4 0 
Missouri 18 6 
Nebraska 6 0 
Nevada 0 0 
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New Hampshire 8 1 
New Jersey 8 2 
New Mexico 2  
New York 39 2 
North Carolina 3 0 
Oregon 1 1 
Pennsylvania 33 3 
Rhode Island 2 0 
South Carolina 7 0 
Tennessee 2 0 
Texas 5 0 
Vermont 2 0 
Virginia 10 0 
Washington 4 0 
West Virginia 4 0 
Wisconsin 10 6 
 
Totals For and Against 
 
363 
 
41 
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Exhibit B249 
 
Introduction of the Sunday Rest Bill in Congress 
 
Hearing before the Senate Committee on Education and Labor, April 6, 
1888, 1 (partial) 
 
 
The Sunday Rest Bill, introduced Dec. 13, 1888 
 
 
249 Apr. 6, 1888 Hearing, supra note 4. 
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